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Whatever happened to the Privatization
Cabinet?
Back in October 1999, when Egypts current cabinet, headed
by Prime Minister Atef Ebeid, was first appointed, government-watchers
anticipated new life being breathed into the countrys privatization
program. Businessmen, along with American structural-adjustment
consultants, had been expressing concern about an evident slowdown
since the previous year in the governments campaign to sell-off
state assets.
Then as now caution could be justified by referring
to unsuitable global economic conditions. But the cabinet shuffle
came at a time when foreign investors were eyeing emerging markets
with renewed interest, while Egypts tourism industry was well
on its way to recovery from the devastations of late 1997.
Ebeid, formerly the minister of public enterprise under Prime Minister
Kamal Al Ganzouri, was recognized as one of the governments
stronger voices in favor of privatization. Ganzouris fall
from grace, amid accusations of blowing the states budget
through mishandling of the national megaprojects, suggested that
the new government was going in with a mandate if not a duty
to put economic reform back on track. The press dubbed the
new team the Privatization Cabinet.
Somehow, that mandate doesnt appear to have been fulfilled.
Of the 348 companies on the list to be privatized under Investment
Law 203 of 1991, about half remain unsold. Not surprisingly, the
most attractive companies such as Al Ahram Beverages or Commercial
International Bank were picked up early, and those that remain
do not look like they have instant money-making potential. Rather
than selling off its assets cheap, however, the government prefers
to engage in endless rounds of restructuring to make the companies
attractive to buyers.
That arguably goes against the basic idea of structural adjustment.
The point of putting state assets into the hands of the private
sector is that better management will follow, and that, as a result,
the economy will benefit from an overall improvement in efficiency.
Private investors who would be willing if the price were
right to take the most derelict companies off the governments
hands would also have a strong motive to make the firms profitable.
For now, however, the prices are clearly not right. Tenders on
state-owned cement companies, for example, have repeatedly been
extended after failures to find buyers. Telecom Egypts inability
to stir foreign investors is more complicated, because of doubts
about the regulatory framework under which the firm will have to
operate. Still, the fastest way to offset such doubts would be to
lower the price tag.
The more cautious approach is to hold on to a company until everything
is fixed and its operations are running smoothly. But the underlying
assumption here is that the necessary improvements can actually
be accomplished within the public sector in which case, why
privatize at all?
By treating privatization as a potential source of revenue, isnt
the government losing sight of the need to invigorate the economy?
State assets are theoretically the property of the Egyptian people,
but wouldnt the people see more rewards from inflows of investment
and creation of jobs than from a few million extra dollars going
into the public coffers at an unspecified date in the future?
Foreign corporations still have their eyes on Egypt, as the recent
gathering of American CEOs for a meeting in Washington with President
Mubarak indicates. Good news for advocates of economic reform perhaps,
but hardly a reason for complacency.
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